The East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s has challenged the widely-held belief that international financial markets should be deregulated. The common arguments both for and against free international capital flows are analysed and contrasted. Given the existence of various distortions and market failures in the global economy, there is a case for some degree of control. The extension and sharpening of market-based prudential instruments appear to be appropriate ways of improving control to avoid the type of crisis that occurred in East Asia.
I. INTRODUCTION
A 1998 World Bank report, East Asia: The Road to Recovery (1998) indicates that from 1990 to the end of 1996, annual private capital flows to developing countries grew more than fivefold (from US$42bn to US$256bn), with commercial bank debt and portfolio investment dominating the growth. The East Asia 5 (Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines) was responsible for nearly 60% of the growth, leading to a 20% annual growth rate in broad money. GDP was also growing at a healthy rate. In the first four of these countries, net private long-term capital inflows increased from 3.3% of GDP in 1990 to 8.3% in 1997. A key issue for policy-makers in these countries was the extent to which these inflows represented genuine long-term investments. This depended upon a significant and growing availability of productive real investment opportunities in their countries. Unfortunately, the apparent lack of sufficient quality productive investment outlets meant that these funds fuelled asset price inflation and led to highly leveraged corporate entities committed to unduly risky projects. Beginning in early 1997, confidence sagged about the quality of these investments, and capital moved out of this region at an alarming rate.
In East Asia, the liberalisation of capital flows led to an extended period of inflows that raised the implied return on local resources, but the subsequent sudden capital outflows made it clear that the riskiness of this return had also gone up. In a world of financial market efficiency, increases in return are expected to be accompanied by increases in risk. However, was the change in the risk-return tradeoff in Asia beneficial? Did capital mobility enable investors to achieve higher risk-adjusted returns? If the answers are no, there must be a case for constraining capital flows.
This experience has prompted a re-think on the value of free capital flows in policy-making circles, academia and the financial sector. The problems of excessively volatile exchange rates and capital flows, and the possibility of a controlling tax, have never been off the research agenda. Tobin (1978) brought forward these issues and they have been widely debated ever since. Frankel (1996) explains that the justifications for a Tobin tax on international capital flows are: international monetary reform; the shifting of resources away from speculators; and the raising of revenue for new projects. The tax would act as a disincentive to short-term flows, but not to long term flows, and so would reduce volatility. Disadvantages of the Tobin tax include: a distortion of the microstructure of foreign exchange markets, leading to wider spreads and even a dangerous breakdown in their decentralised, over-the-counter characteristic; and difficulties in enforceability as countries will be tempted to compete for market share by lowering their Tobin tax.
In a first-best world, that is one with no distortions or market failures to disrupt the operation of the free market mechanism, there is no case for controlling capital flows. The first-best optimum is the benchmark result arising from standard economic foundations. Given any distortion, we can expect an intervention to exist that can deliver the second-best optimum. However with many distortions and failures existing simultaneously, an intervention may be counter-productive if prescribed on the basis of only a subset of these.
International financial capital flows, in an uncertain world with distortions or market failures (for example, tariffs, asymmetric information, moral hazard from public sector support of the private sector, adverse selection whereby high-quality firms under-borrow and low-quality ones over-borrow, public 'bads' such as systemic risk, speculative bandwagons or herding behaviour), bring both costs and benefits to investors, financial institutions, consumers and governments in the originating and recipient countries. The net welfare effects of these capital flows are by no means obvious and the optimal prescription is unlikely to lie at the extremes of the spectrum-that is, with completely free and unfettered flows, or alternatively highly regulated, even prohibited flows. The big policy question is to determine an appropriate solution somewhere between the extremes. Rarely are there Pareto-improving policy adjustments in this area, and so it is never going to be easy in practice to find a definitive answer. Invariably, the varying of a tax or the changing of a regulation will improve the welfare of one set of stakeholders, but worsen another's. This paper provides a limited survey of the types of gains and losses to be weighed in the search for optimum controlling policies.
The main gains from international capital flows arise from an intertemporal smoothing of aggregate consumption, taxation smoothing, an extension of opportunities for reducing risk through the international diversification of portfolios, and from a liberation of aggregate national investment from the constraint of national savings. In general, a borrowing country would prefer long-term to short-term investment from abroad. With the former, the implied expected returns on resources may be increased at the cost of a smaller rise in risk. The borrowing countries face the difficult problem of how to encourage long-term flows that remain for extended periods. It is possible that the freedom to move liquid capital may encourage long-term foreign direct investment 1 . The freedom to move capital reduces the costs constraining direct investment, and the volume of foreign direct investment grows 2 . Not only is this likely to raise employment or wages, but usually direct investment comes with a technology transfer, which is a major source of economic growth.
The East Asian experience has made it obvious that free capital mobility has a downside, arising not only from the potential for sudden massive portfolio outflows of capital, but also from the curtailment of macroeconomic policy options. Sudden outflows represent risk, and may lead to arguments for capital controls. Uncertainty, per se, does not necessarily constitute a basis for such arguments; in the presence of a distortion or market failure, there will be a valid case. From a macroeconomic perspective, a small country's government that chooses unrestrained capital movements cannot operate independent monetary and exchange rate policies. If it wishes to use interest rates to achieve a monetary target, it must leave the exchange rate to be determined by market forces. The exchange rate will then be vulnerable to volatile international capital flows, and its moves will occasionally be excruciatingly painful. Instead a government can choose to target the exchange rate, in which case it must be prepared to allow the interest rate to be market-determined. There will be times when the increased volatility of interest rates may be difficult to support. Further it will always be aware that an exchange rate target 3 will expose the country to the danger of a speculative attack. Since asset price over-shooting is unavoidable, the appropriate choice of exchange rate regime is always going to be difficult to resolve.
People with heterogeneous information sets and beliefs inhabit financial markets. Unsurprisingly, it may be prudent for an ill-informed investor to jump on the bandwagon of a movement set up by a large and influential set of players. This can lead to excessive over-shooting in response to a minor change in information. In this context, one may regard the depreciations in East Asia in 1997/8 as somewhat excessive-for example the Indonesian rupiah depreciated by about 80% between July 1997 and January 1998. These depreciations helped to convert illiquidities into insolvencies for many financial and industrial corporations, and unduly depressed the regional economy. Much of the foreign borrowing was unhedged and so balance sheet indicators were forced into danger zones; further the cost of vital imports became exorbitant. Most central bank, having exhausted their reserves, were powerless to intervene in foreign exchange markets and had to seek help from the IMF, who realised immediately that the crisis could not be stemmed by simply providing loans to bolster foreign exchange reserves. Interest rates had to be raised temporarily to support the process of re-stabilising the market, further increasing the operating costs of the highly leveraged private sector. Without doubt, as in any economy, there were structural problems in this region that needed to be addressed. However the exchange rate swings and the accompanying interest rate hikes were so severe that it is likely that unnecessary collateral damage occurred. Would capital taxes or stronger prudential measures on financial institutions have sufficiently discouraged the stampeding capital outflows?
In subsequent sections, a more detailed analysis is offered to help answer this critical question. Section II provides some explanations for the intertemporal benefits from opening to international capital markets, focussing on consumption smoothing, capital market power, the independence of national investment and savings, tax smoothing and international portfolio diversification. Section III discusses some cost arguments mounted against free capital flows-uncertainty, hysteresis, financial vulnerability in emerging countries with rational herding behaviour, and macroeconomic and financial constraints. Some concluding comments are provided in the final section.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR FREE CAPITAL FLOWS

Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing
With borrowing or lending abroad, the direct link between investment and saving in equilibrium is weakened, thus allowing smoother aggregate consumption over time and freeing up the choice of the optimal time path for aggregate consumption. By exploiting the comparative advantage that a country may have in lending or borrowing, there may be substantial gains from capital trade.
The gains from intertemporal trade can most easily be demonstrated in a neoclassical 2 country-2 period model of consumption 4 , and the arguments extend easily to a multi-country-multi-period model. In autarky, the equilibrium real rate of interest in each country (r A , r A *) is determined by the equality of local savings and investment. In Figure 1 , r A is given by the (the negative of the) slope of the indifference curve going through point A, the autarkic equilibrium point for consumption in period 1 (C 1 ) and 2 (C 2 ). Assume the foreign country has a comparative advantage in lending, so that r A > r A *. If all impediments to capital trade were removed, capital would flow internationally and the equilibrium world interest rate, r, would lie between the two autarkic rates (and is the negative of the slope of the straight line between A and F in Figure 1 , the international borrowing possibility frontier). The home country would borrow and the foreign country would lend at the mutually advantageous rate, and the rate improvements would be indicative measures of the gains from trade. With standard first best world equilibrium conditions assumed, consumption over time would be smoothed in both countries, and intertemporal utility would be improved (that is, F lies on a higher indifference curve than does A in Figure 1 ).
In a multi-country world, no small country could do better than the free capital trade equilibrium. However if one or more countries had some market power, so that their governments' intervention could affect the equilibrium intertemporal terms of trade, r, there would be a standard optimal capital tax argument for intervention. If the home country has the market power of a strong international borrower, a small tax on its borrowing will restrict that borrowing, which in turn will reduce the world rate of interest and thus the return to foreign lenders. In Figure 1 , the consumption point moves northwest from F along the foreign offer curve, OO. Though the after-tax rate is higher for home borrowers, all of the tax revenue reverts in aggregate to home residents. Thus the small tax diverts resources from foreign lenders to domestic borrowers. Or, by imposing a small tax, the home country forgoes some consumption in period 1, but makes an advantageous gain in period 2. As the tax is raised further, eventually it must become prohibitive and autarky would be restored. It follows that there must be a positive optimal tax on capital inflows that maximises the welfare gain by the home country, and this is shown at T.
Lending countries with market power will have a corresponding incentive to tax international lending. By taxing outflows, the volume will be limited and the world rate of interest will be pushed up. As before, there will be a positive optimal tax on capital outflows. Any borrowing country's welfare gain from taxation has to be at the expense of foreign lenders, who must then have an incentive to retaliate (if individually they have market power, or if not, by colluding). In an ensuing trade war, the gains from international capital trade can easily be frittered away. Naturally, if one side, say the lenders', has significantly more market power than the other, it will end up as a winner of the war. However both lenders and borrowers may be worse off relative to the free capital equilibrium. In these circumstances, multilateral cooperative agreements on international capital trade could be negotiated to achieve an outcome that best delivers the potential gains from trade.
The neo-classical model that has been outlined suggests definite gains from free capital trade, particularly if no country has market power in capital markets. For this conclusion to hold up, it is essential that there are no other distortions elsewhere in the economy. For example, free capital inflows may 'immiserise' 5 an economy if there are tariffs or quotas on traded goods. These distortions create protected sectors that penalise
The Optimal Tax on International Capital Flows Figure 1 welfare, and the capital inflows only amplify this penalty. Given prevailing tariffs or quotas, an optimal capital inflow tax may be appropriate.
International Borrowing for Domestic Real Investment
If international capital flows are prohibited, aggregate domestic investment is constrained by national savings. A country, that would otherwise borrow further, limits its international opportunities for growth by this prohibition. With r A >r A *, the marginal product of investment would remain higher in autarky than in an equilibrium that permitted international borrowing, and the volume of investment would be lower. By introducing real investment to the model of Figure 1 , the autarkic equilibrium point, A, must sit on a closed economy concave consumption possibility frontier (not shown in Figure 1 ). The concavity arises from the assumption of diminishing marginal productivity of investment, with an expansion of investment leading to a north west move up the frontier. This move represents the growth enhancing aspect of investment-by foregoing some current consumption, future consumption can be higher depending on the marginal productivity of the additional investment. Thus the extra investment from opening to international borrowing provides an increased consumption possibility frontier and leads to a more efficient utilisation of domestic resources. In Figure 1 this is represented by a parallel shift of the foreign offer curve moving the domestic consumption possibility point from A to A', and the attendant equilibrium free capital trade equilibrium point for consumption from F to F'. In equilibrium, international borrowing will be undertaken to support both the additional investment and the smoothed consumption path. The intertemporal consumption smoothing gains from international capital trades are significantly enhanced by the investment expansion, and welfare will be greater.
Similar arguments apply to taxing capital flows in the presence of investment. A large borrowing country, that can exercise its financial muscle through taxes to improve its terms of capital trade (ie lower the world rate of interest), can exploit its power. With a small tax, the tax revenue more than compensates for the increase in the domestic after-tax rate of interest. The investment gain shrinks but the period 2 consumption gain from the better terms of trade continues to dominate. If too high a tax is imposed, the falls in investment and period 1 consumption become too great to justify any borrowing abroad. The concave foreign offer curve parallel to OO in Figure 1 which would pass through A' and F' will define a positive optimal tax that yields the highest level of welfare, represented by point T'. The dangers of retaliation and capital tax wars are even more acute in the presence of real investment, as is the need for multilateral cooperative agreements. The effects of other distortions, such as tariffs, are likely to be amplified in the presence of real investment, and the need for second-best intervention enhanced. Of course, a small country that cannot influence the equilibrium world interest rate loses by taxing. The tax revenue gain can never compensate for the losses incurred from reduced domestic investment and diminished consumption smoothing.
How might one quantify the likely net gains from capital trade as described above? This is not easy, though the attempts that have been made do suggest that there are net gains to be had.
An upper bound on the real investment gains might be estimated roughly from standard growth accounting.
6 For a wide range of countries, the average capital-output ratio is about 2.5, and the average current account deficit (capital inflow) is about 4% of GDP. Thus if this inflow was all committed to real investment, the capital stock growth would be greater by 1.6%. With the estimated share of capital in output being about 0.3, output growth would increase by a mere 0.48%. This pessimistic figure arises because the sources of growth are being treated as exogenous. Endogenous growth models emphasise positive externalities and increasing returns, and will deliver healthier predictions for the effects of international capital inflows. By modelling foreign direct investment for 69 developing countries, Borenszstein, De Gregorio and Lee (1995) show that the output elasticity is 0.8, suggesting that if current account deficits were matched by foreign direct investment inflows, the gain in endogenous growth would be significant (ie of the order 3.2% per year).
Taxation Smoothing
Another important role of international capital flows is to support an intertemporal smoothing of domestic taxation. For developing countries with inadequate domestic bond markets, borrowing from abroad helps to spread the taxation load over time. This borrowing can be used to finance potentially productive infrastructural expenditure, which may yield future output gains to ameliorate the need for future taxation. The international borrowing thus takes the pressure off current taxpayers whose savings may be very limited. The optimal level of borrowing would be determined by setting the expected marginal yield of public sector investment to the cost of the borrowing, which in turn is governed by the international capital market's perception of sovereign risk (mainly of default).
Lenders may need to ration the volume extended on account of the default risk. At low levels of lending, further lending will become available at higher interest rates. However as the interest cost rises, the likelihood of default becomes more acute. Eventually, this becomes an over-bearing problem and the supply of funds becomes inelastic-rationing sets in. The Latin American and Sub-Saharan debt crisis in the early 1980s differed from the East Asian one in the late 1990s in that it was mainly associated with excessive public sector borrowing (and international lending) caused by an inadequate evaluation of sovereign risks. International commercial banks were flush with oil deposits, and faced fierce competition in asset management. At the time, there appeared to be a misguided belief that there was no credit risk in lending to foreign governments. Thus over-lending took place, and the ensuing crisis was resolved by costly reschedulings through the issue of Brady bonds. With information on aggregate outstanding lending not transparent, the lending institutions unsurprisingly over-lent, and this created potential instability in the international financial system. There might be a case for taxing or controlling international lending if the information problem cannot be otherwise resolved. However the 1980s debt crisis did prompt a significant enhancement in the provision of information on sovereign asset and liability positions, as well as an improvement in the quality of signals coming from rating agencies.
International Diversification
International portfolio diversification provides a potentially powerful mechanism for consumption smoothing in the face of country-specific risks. So long as a country's asset returns are not perfectly correlated with those of other countries, there will be gains available from international diversification. For a poorer country, the downside risk is likely to be more serious since it tends to be more specialised in production-it is subject to a more compelling country-specific risk. The gains from international risk pooling are therefore much greater for poor countries than rich ones that tend to be diversified in production. This provides a strong case for developing countries to allow free capital outflows so that domestic savings (by pension funds, for example) can reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Equivalently, rich countries can improve the risk profile of their portfolios by including emerging and other developing country assets in their portfolios. The optimal proportions assigned to such assets will depend critically on their expected returns, variances and covariances with other international assets.
An intriguing puzzle in international finance is the fact that the portfolios of assets in any country are heavily biased towards assets of domestic origin. Almost any version of an international capital asset pricing model predicts that the composition of national portfolios should converge towards that of a global portfolio. Many reasons have been offered for the domestic biases (eg costs of monitoring foreign markets, liquidity differentials, legal variations, non-traded goods etc), but the potential gains remain large and probably outweigh these costs. Lewis (1998) suggests a 20-100% potential improvement in lifetime (permanent) consumption for US investors (for data between 1969 and 1993) if they had pursued a global strategy. If such large gains are at stake, it is surprising that thresholds for investing internationally have been binding constraints. Normally, one might believe that taxes or controls on these potentially beneficial capital flows would raise the threshold further, and therefore should be reduced. However it is also possible to conceive of realistic circumstances where risk may be improved with better regulation and/or control of capital flows. In the next section, this possibility is canvassed.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREE CAPITAL FLOWS
Income Uncertainty
The addition of uncertainty to the neoclassical 2-period-2-country model developed in the previous section imposes costs on capital trading. Do these costs justify intervention? To begin to answer this, consider the implications of uncertainty with respect to consumption in period 2. In Figure 1 , with the assumption of income certainty, free capital mobility raises welfare for a small economy, since point F is on a higher indifference curve than A (and F' even higher when real investment is permitted), and furthermore, for a large country it may be able to exploit market power with an optimal tax to reach T (or even T'). Now assume that the consumption outcome in period 2 is a stochastic process whose mean is shown as C 2 in Figure 1 . Both the mean and variance of the stochastic process are dependent on the level of investment and borrowing in period 1. The risk averse private sector will then set the marginal intertemporal rate of substitution equal to the world rate of interest plus a consumption risk premium. This means that the international borrowing possibility frontier (AF) is no longer a straight line and becomes concave. In maximising expected utility, concavity will lead to reduced borrowing compared to the certainty case. Thus optimal borrowing will take proper account of the risky outcomes.
Is there a case for taxing international capital flows to reduce borrowing further on account of the uncertainty? Not in the model outlined above. However if the government believes that the private sector does not or cannot account sufficiently for systemic risk, then there might be a case.
An individual investor may not have adequate information about the actual risks faced. However in this event (which was surely true for East Asian countries in the 1990s), the appropriate intervention would be in the form of requiring improved transparency of the financial, corporate and public sectors of the country.
The neoclassical model being used above assumes the existence of a representative household. This is clearly an over-simplification, even if it is extremely convenient for analysis. Even with heterogenous households, private financial markets may exist to transfer risk to those willing to bear more from those desiring less. But if not all households have access to capital markets, a market failure may exist. For example, there may be many low wealth households whose consumption is income-constrained and who cannot take advantage of capital markets. Yet the macroeconomic consequences (from variable exchange rates and interest rates) of the uncertainty on international capital markets will typically have an impact on the rich and poor alike. This problem is captured in the phrase -"The rich borrow, and the poor pay the price!" If it is judged by government that the vulnerability of incomes of poor households is significantly affected by the extent of international borrowing (even if optimal from the perspective of the borrowing households and companies), then it may feel obliged to tax or regulate those international borrowings accordingly.
Hysteresis Arguments
With capital inflows as the driving force of the balance of payments, as experienced in East Asia in the early 1990s following liberalisation, the exchange rate must strengthen as a consequence. This would be an unremarkable occurrence in a conventional context since a gradual depreciation reversal would occur later, when the borrowing phase ends. However in the presence of 'hysteresis' effects 7 , capital inflows can have long-lasting real effects that may not be desirable. These may arise if there are dynamic comparative advantages, so that a substantial real exchange rate appreciation caused by capital inflows has serious long term effects on the tradable sector 8 . For example, in the presence of sunk costs and irreversible investments in this sector, the thresholds for resource re-allocation may be breached, and a new persistent equilibrium established with exports depressed and import substitution encouraged. These hysteresis effects would mean that the correction of the current account deficit in the future becomes less likely. As a consequence, the exchange rate will collapse, sooner rather than later, risking financial chaos in its wake. To avoid these effects, mechanisms to control the original capital inflows may be appropriate. However the protection afforded from avoiding these dynamic comparative advantage effects in goods markets have to be weighed up against the foregone gains from trade arising from comparative advantage in capital markets.
Financial sector vulnerability and rational herding behaviour
The East Asian emerging economies in the 1990s had some critical factors that distinguished them from emerged ones. In particular, capital inflows supported their development process, but the investments would have needed more time before becoming profitable. There is a compelling view that the profitability of many of the investments that took place in East Asia was grossly over-rated. Excessive investment occurred there because of a mistaken belief in an East Asian miracle. For example, Young (1992) showed that the experience of Singapore was the result of excessive investment, not technological progress, and that, despite its massive investment program, it grew no faster than Hong Kong. This represented a major challenge to new growth theory that had given oxygen to the miracle thesis. Not only is it likely that there was excessive real investment, but also the domestic financial sectors were undercapitalised. Typically, the financial sectors in the emerging economies have a shallower capital base, and tend to be more vulnerable to collapse in the event of sudden capital outflows. Some outflow might be quite a natural response to the re-evaluation of relative profitability of real investments. But these outflows may turn out to be excessive because of rational 9 herding behaviour, and some kind of capital tax might be useful to curb this excess. Cordella (1998) develops a simple example to show how a tax on international capital returns may be needed to prevent the rational imitation of normal disinvestors. In any period, there will be a natural proportion of foreign investors who will need to disinvest early. This can occur when random shocks require the liquidation of marginal foreign investments. It might arise from better opportunities elsewhere for particular investors, or on account of a liquidity crisis in their core activities at home. The danger for the domestic country that hosted the foreign investment is that other foreign investors may prefer the returns from imitating the natural disinvestors to the returns from persisting with the investment. This imitation may reflect the herd-like behaviour observed in international capital markets, which is responsible for high exchange rate volatility and the associated crises. A tax on capital flows can raise the cost of imitation, and curb bank runs and speculative capital flight.
In this model, there are three periods (1, 2 and 3) and two types of foreign investors. In period 1, the foreign investors invest in the domestic (emerging) country through a domestic financial intermediary, not knowing whether they will need to repatriate their investment for liquidity purposes in period 2 or waiting till period 3. The period 1 probabilities of disinvestment are identical across investors. At the beginning of period 2, the liquidity needs are realised, and each investor discovers their type, that is whether liquidation is necessary in period 2, or whether their investment can remain till period 3. If only one of the investor types has to liquidate immediately, it remains possible that the other (who does not have to liquidate early) might choose rationally to follow suit, if the cost of waiting another period to disinvest exceeds the benefit. This market failure can occur only if there is some sort of financial market inefficiency. In this particular example, the intermediary fails to penalise early withdrawals at an appropriate rate. This may be because the intermediary believes that penalties would divert business to competitors. Then, in the competitive equilibrium, the individual intermediary has no incentive to impose a penalty. Instead, the government may introduce an investment tax that acts like an early withdrawal penalty.
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Suppose that a period 2 withdrawal by one investor type occurs immediately after discovering the liquidity need. If the other investor type also happens to need to withdraw, the financial intermediary is bankrupted and both investor types can obtain their fair share of the assets in period 2. As might be expected for an investment in an emerging country that takes time to mature into profitability, the returns on the investment after bankruptcy in period 2 are negative. The returns can only be positive if the investment is allowed to mature over 3 periods. Thus if the other investor type chooses to remain invested till period 3, the return will be based on its share of the profits from the enterprise. Owing to the financial market inefficiency described above, it remains possible that the return from waiting till period 3 may turn out to be negative, if the other investor type has had to withdraw. In fact, this return may be more negative than that suffered by imitating the other investor type in period 2. In this event, the other investor type will imitate the natural disinvestor, leading to financial distress and capital flight.
So how might the return from waiting to period 3 be negative in the event of a natural disinvestment by the other investor type? The early disinvestors would get their capital back (with no penalty), while the remaining investors suffer the standard negative return in period 2 (which can be improved by waiting for maturity in period 3). Thus, in effect, the latter group is subsidising the former in period 2, and the compensation from waiting till period 3 may be less than the subsidy. This loss from waiting to period 3 can easily be greater than the loss from imitating the natural disinvestors in period 2.
A capital tax can be designed to mimic the required penalty for early withdrawals and raise the cost of imitation. It imposes a penalty on the early disinvestors, reducing the implied subsidy paid by the remaining investors. There may be a sufficiently high tax that discourages rational imitation and financial collapse. It is even possible that the existence of the capital tax encourages the volume of initial capital inflow-the emerging country may be more attractive to international investors if there is less danger from early capital flight. The capital tax helps to correct the effects of the market distortion. This tax may be in the form of reserve requirements along the lines of controls introduced by Chile 11 . A more extensive market-based design has been proposed by Greenspan (1998) whereby capital requirements and charges are imposed on both lending and borrowing banks.
Macroeconomic and financial market constraints
Policies for the regulation of international capital flows cannot be devised in isolation from other instruments of macroeconomic policy. A government can choose any two of freely mobile international capital, exchange rate stability and an independent monetary policy. Obstfeld and Taylor(1997) have named this the 'classical trilemma', while Frankel (1996) calls it the "impossible trinity"-it harks back to the Mundellian literature on international monetary economics.
Thus a commitment to free capital flows forces governments to choose between discretion in their monetary policy or on an appropriate exchange rate. For a developing or newly emerged country, this can be an excruciating choice. If the financial system is fragile (perhaps undercapitalised, or with excessive balance sheet values at risk, or because of weak governance), a government may feel the need to control both the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate. If either of these were too volatile, the risk of collapse of exposed financial intermediaries may be too great to accept. The financial sector plays a critical role in the growth process of a marketoriented economy. There is a natural concern about possible financial collapse, and central banks and treasuries are acutely aware of the need to maintain a healthy financial sector. For modern industrialised economies, this role is often taken for granted -in most growth accounting research, the contribution of the financial sector is largely ignored. In contrast, for underdeveloped and emerging countries, stability and the evolution of financial intermediaries is recognised explicitly as a major factor in development and growth processes. This need for financial stability may not be realised in practice, because of poor governance, inexperience, and inadequate prudential supervision. In fact, financial liberalisation can be dangerous if these weaknesses of the financial sector have not been first addressed. The sequencing of structural reforms and capital (and trade) liberalisation is a very complicated problem which has attracted a significant literature 12 .
It may be argued that free international capital acts as an unbiased referee of the suitability of internal policy settings and on the underlying viability of local financial markets. However the very volatility that this mobility may induce, in either interest rates or the exchange rate, could bring about the demise of the financial system for which it is blowing the whistle. Therefore capital flows may operate like an unreasonable referee that red-cards minor offenders, thus destroying the very game that he is supposed to maintain. For some under-developed and emerging economies, there is a real fear of the international capital referee. Further, this referee effectively penalises both the guilty and the innocent. When sudden capital outflows occur, the exchange rate may collapse, accompanied by a general fall in stockmarkets. Well-managed enterprises with reasonable borrowing strategies will be adversely affected, along with the mismanaged ones that may have precipitated the crisis. Therefore, a sensible option is to severely restrict international capital flows, and to rely on domestic investors as an alternative referee. The government is then free to choose both an interest rate and an exchange rate target, and thus can keep the economy travelling steadily on its course.
This argument breaks down when there is insufficient independence between the political and the financial and corporate estates. In general terms, this is the 'moral hazard' argument that has become one popular explanation for the East Asian malaise (for example, see Krugman (1998) ). If participants in the government of the day have too large a stake in financial and corporate enterprises, there will be a reluctance to allow any form of whistle-blowing on inefficient, let alone insolvent players. The natural occurrence of bankruptcies, mergers or takeovers may be proscribed by political decree, thus perpetuating inefficiencies or excessive risk-taking. Equally, the crony-type links between government and financial and corporate enterprises will encourage flows of funds to support those governments even when making poor political decisions, thus perpetuating political inefficiencies. With such dependencies, there can be substantial value in having free international capital flows as a disciplining device on the economy and the government.
For a country suffering these 'moral hazard' problems, the disciplining capital flows will necessarily involve harsh fluctuations in the exchange rate. When capital outflows are so severe that a vulnerable financial sector would be threatened, there may be little alternative to raising interest rates dramatically. This was inevitable in the cases of Thailand, Indonesia and Korea 13 immediately after their currencies collapsed in 1997/8. It was a vital part of the IMF prescription, and probably unavoidable under the circumstances. This fatalistic conclusion is simply a reflection of the 'classical trilemma' problem in a situation of unrestrained capital flows. There may be a strong temptation to avoid the pain of the cure by resorting to strict capital controls-Malaysia succumbed to this in 1998. The big danger is that its government loses credibility making future attempts at liberalisation more difficult, even if, by then, the country has put its financial and corporate fundamentals in order.
There is some evidence of lax financial management and supervision within the emerging East Asian countries. There were definite symptoms of weakness: low capital-adequacy ratios for banks, inadequate transparency of bank operations, poor design and enforcement of lending limits on individual entities, insufficient provisioning for non-performing assets, excessive relational banking with lending based on doubtful collateral etc. But these same problems exist in many countries, and it is hard to conclude that the East Asian financial crisis would not have occurred if the domestic banking systems had bee better supervised and governed. While more effective supervision and governance is always more desirable, it is not clear that the differences in supervision between countries that suffered and those that escaped the crisis were significant. Equally the differences in 'moral hazard' across countries (industrialised, emerging or developing) may also not have been significant
14 .
An analysis of the East Asian financial crisis cannot ignore the role of international commercial banks and hedge funds on the 'supply' side. In the 1990s, international commercial banks became the major source of funds for investment banks and hedge funds. They adjudged and accepted the credit risks, and passed on the asset price and exchange rate risks to arbitrageurs. These arbitrageurs operated in a very competitive environment, made possible by global deregulation. They operate on the short side of the portfolio spectrum, and were deeply involved in the subsequent capital flight from East Asia. Without doubt they have contributed to the instabilities of the international financial system, and it is widely recognised that financial supervision in all countries needs to be extended to cover their activities. Nevertheless, even if they became fully and effectively supervised, it is not clear that the volatility of international capital flows would be significantly reduced. Further, in the Asia crisis, commercial banks themselves were heavily implicated in arbitrage trading on their own accounts.
The instability in the international financial system across East Asia in 1997/8 can be explained to some extent as a rational response to deteriorating fundamentals in the suffering economies (see Corsetti et al(1998) ), and in hindsight, one can observe their gradual deterioration.. Yet, ex-ante, key international organisations, such as the IMF, expressed only mild concern and did not warn that a crisis was imminent. If the massive capital outflows had not taken place in 1997/8, international experts would almost certainly have continued to discuss cautiously the structural problems of the region, and would not have warned against massive capital outflows. In retrospect, there is now considerable discussion in official circles about the lack of transparency in the affected countries. The implication is that with improved information, the capital outflows may have been more predictable, and might even have dissuaded panic sellers, or averteded the self-fulfilling negative sentiment that developed 15 . Though improved transparency is always good everywhere, it is hard to believe that the official forecasters would have predicted the depth of the crisis. A strange and interesting feature was its timing and the way it spread across the region-these surprising contagion effects need far more research.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper, a wide range of arguments has been discussed, both for and against controlling international capital flows. In the final analysis, both sides of the debate have some merit. The conclusion must be that a certain amount of control or regulation is warranted insofar as it facilitates the long term achievement of the benefits that international capital trade can undoubtedly bring.
A normal degree of volatility in asset prices is a good thing, because it can guide capital to its most productive areas. If controls and regulations were so invasive as to prevent normal asset price changes, misallocation of resources would quickly emerge. On the other hand, abnormal volatility can create undesirable short-term effects, which may even persist into the longterm. In the presence of distortions that cause such abnormalities, governments have a responsibility to control the flows that give rise to these excessive asset price movements. Indeed everywhere, governments exercise this responsibility either by prudential or non-prudential means Over the last twenty years, non-prudential controls have been lifted in most countries. At the same time, prudential controls have been improved, refined and standardised to some degree. The problems in East Asia were exacerbated because non-prudential controls were lifted, while the remaining prudential ones were inadequate in the face of other structural deficiencies. There has certainly been noticeable progress in solving these problems in some of the affected East Asian countries. For example, South Korea has done much in the way of bank and corporate restructuring, and this has helped it move out of recession.
It would be fair to say that market-based prudential controls are widely supported as appropriate instruments for financial market intervention. Direct taxes and non-market based controls have diminishing support. They have high collection and monitoring costs, they are relatively easy to avoid and, too often are driven by revenue-raising objectives.
There are no easy solutions in coming to terms with all of these difficult problems in international financial markets. There are natural tensions between the desire for national sovereignty, the desire to exploit comparative advantages in international capital trade, and the need to regulate the global capital market. The difficulties in solving these tensions are widely recognised, and are encapsulated in the search for a new 'international financial architecture '. Fischer (1999) raises the issues of the role of an international lender of last resort, the appropriate level of reserve holdings, the choices of exchange rate system, measures to obtain private sector support in crises, and the need for better international standards on banking, fiscal and monetary practice, transparency, accounting, financial markets and bankruptcy. All of these are major issues that require substantial research and debate inside academia, government circles and international fora. 
ENDNOTES
1 From the IMF's "World Economic Outlook" 1999, it appears that foreign direct investment into emerging countries fell by less than 1% between 1997 and 1998. Indonesia was the only country to experience a sharp fall, and Thailand and South Korea experienced small increases despite recession. 2 Laban and Larrain (1997) develop a model of 'irreversible' investment to show that reducing controls on capital outflows can increase capital inflows. By reducing the minimum capital repatriation period for foreign investment, the option value of waiting to invest falls, and investment inflows are enhanced. 3 In fact, most East Asian economies did not have freely floating exchange rates prior to the crisis. Indonesia had a 4% crawling target range against the US$. The Thai baht targeted a basket of currencies (mainly the US$). Malaysia linked the ringgit to the US$, and allowed a gradual appreciation. The South Korean won floated inside a 2.25% band with the US$, which was moved down substantially in 1996. The Hong Kong dollar operated as a currency board, with a peg to the US$. When registering capital inflows in the 1990s, the governments in these economies did not allow their nominal or real exchange rates to appreciate significantly. In some cases, even fiscal contraction was used to support this policy. 4 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , Chapter 1, for an analysis of this model 5 For example, see Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) 6 See Krugman (1993) . He uses Mankiw, Romer and Weil's (1992) cross section estimates for the Solow residual of 98 countries. 7 Hysteresis is a phenomenon whereby initial conditions affect dynamic paths as well as long run outcomes. 8 Krugman(1987) argued for the protection of the tradable sector from flows that led to excessive appreciation. 9 Rational herding behaviour is in sharp contrast to that generated by panic, for which there is no good economic explanation. 10 Alternatively, intermediaries may collude in their liability design to include appropriate penalties. However the government may prefer to discourage any form of collusion so that the industry remains competitive. 11 In 1991,Chile imposed a 30% reserve requirement at the Central Bank for one year on any non-direct foreign investment inflow. 12 For a useful survey of the critical issues in sequencing, see Eichengreen et al. (1999) 13 The average yield spread over US Treasury Bonds for Indonesian bonds ranged from 170 basis points in September 1997 to 710 in January 1998. For Thailand, the spread was 175 and 500, and for Korea was 90 to 400. See UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 1998, p68 14 For example, the necessary private bailout of the Long Term Capital Management Fund in the US in 1998, at the effective bidding of the Federal Reserve Board, is suggestive of a widespread moral hazard problem.
